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This policy primer discusses how EU membership shapes UK migration policy.
The issue: How does EU membership shape 
UK migration policy?
 
To understand how EU membership shapes UK migration 
policy, one must distinguish between four aspects of EU 
law and policy.
 
First, at the core of the EU project remains a common 
market, which involves reciprocal commitments so that 
not only products (goods and services) but also the 
factors of production (labour and capital) can circulate 
freely. Free movement for workers and others exercising 
economic freedoms (e.g. service providers and 
recipients) has now been subsumed into the status of 
Citizenship of the Union. As explored in the next section, 
movement and residence in all Member States for EU 
nationals remains a defining feature of EU Citizenship, 
so that UK nationals may in principle live anywhere 
they choose within the EU, and vice versa. Citizenship 
of the Union and the internal market freedoms mainly 
confer rights on EU Citizens (i.e. those holding the 
nationality of the Member States), although they may 
also create some derivative rights for so-called ‘Third 
Country Nationals’ (TCNs), such as family members of 
EU Citizens and TCN workers ‘posted’ from one Member 
State to another to as part of an intra-EU provision of 
services.
 
Secondly, while the UK’s commitments on EU Citizenship 
and the internal market are part and parcel of its EU 
membership, the UK (together with Ireland, with which 
it shares a land border and a common travel area) has 
always maintained a distinctive position on borders 
and visas, as manifest in its opt-out of the Schengen 
arrangements. As explored in Part 3, the UK’s distinctive 
opt-out from Schengen has been legally controversial, 
yet it remains a defining feature of its EU relations.
 
Thirdly, concerning asylum, the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1997) marked a decisive shift, with the EU becoming 
competent for the first time to adopt binding EU law 
in this field, with the aim of establishing a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS). The UK (with Ireland) 
has an option to participate in this policy area, and has 
chosen to opt in to all the key EU asylum measures 
adopted between 1999 and 2004. However, in this 
field, the new coalition government’s position appears to 
have shifted of late, as explored in Part 4 below.
 
Fourthly, the EU is also competent to adopt measures on 
immigration of TCNs into the EU. Here too the UK has an 
opt-in arrangement, but has tended to opt in only rarely 
to EU measures in this field. As will be discussed further 
below, while this leaves the UK free to set its own labour 
migration policy, it may also end up at a disadvantage in 
attracting high skilled migrants.
Who enjoys rights of movement and 
residence in the UK as a result of EU 
citizenship and the Internal Market?
The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 introduced the 
formal status of Citizenship of the Union, building 
on previous rights to free movement, residence and 
non-discrimination for workers and service-providers. 
Citizenship of the Union now provides rights of 
movement and residence not only for the economically 
active, but also for job-seekers, students and retirees, 
within certain limits. The non-economically active usually 
need to have health insurance and sufficient resources 
so as not to become an unreasonable burden on the 
host state. The extent to which EU Citizens are entitled 
to equal treatment depends on their economic activity, 
their degree of integration in the host state and the 
nature of the benefit claimed. The precise scope of their 
entitlements is subject to intense debate and judicial 
scrutiny. For instance, while migrant EU students pay the 
same fees as home students, they may not be entitled 
to similar maintenance grants unless they have been 
previously resident in the UK for a considerable period of 
time.
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Luxembourg (CJEU), together with national courts, has 
been a key actor in the development of EU Citizenship, 
with EU legislation reflecting many precepts initially 
developed by the judiciary (Citizenship Directive 2004). 
EU rights are strong: They are individual guarantees, 
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enforceable in national courts, taking precedence over 
national law. Member States may only restrict free 
movement on limited, individual grounds, for instance if 
an individual poses a ‘genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society.’ This explains why the UK cannot 
countenance imposing a general cap on migration of 
nationals of EU Member States, as this would amount to 
a violation of EU Treaty rules.
 
A8 countries – temporary transitional limitations
On 1 May 2004, the EU enlarged to include ten new 
Members States. In relation to eight of these, (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia or Slovenia – the so-called ‘A8 countries’), 
the Accession Treaties allowed restrictions on free 
movement for a temporary period, which expired on 1 
May 2011. The UK (with Ireland and Sweden) decided 
from the outset not to use this restriction, allowing A8 
nationals access to the UK labour market, albeit subject 
to a registration requirement (the Workers Registration 
Scheme) and limitations on access to benefits. Since 
2004, other Member States (Finland, Greece, Portugal, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain) lifted restrictions, 
with all others having done so by 1 May 2011. That 
original UK decision to open its labour market to A8 
nationals resulted in larger than anticipated numbers 
of labour migrants coming to the UK (Ruhs 2006), 
but it already appears that much of that migration is 
temporary, characterised by comings and goings, with 
many A8 nationals predicted to return home in coming 
years (Pollard N., Latorre M. and Sriskandarajah D. 
2008). (See further The Migration Observatory briefing 
on Migration Flows of A8 and other EU Migrants to and 
from the UK).
A2 countries - temporary transitional limitations
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007. 
Transitional provisions permit Member States to restrict 
the free movement of workers. Bulgaria and Romania 
are currently subject to restrictions in the UK, and 
nine other Member States (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and 
Malta) and must obtain a work permit in order to work 
there. In contrast, they currently enjoy full rights to free 
movement in the 15 other States (Denmark, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Finland, Sweden, Hungary, Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
the Czech Republic). It is important to note that these 
transitional arrangements only apply to workers, not to 
service providers or those establishing businesses. These 
restrictive measures will expire in 2014 in any event.
 
TCNs, EU Citizenship and Internal Market Freedoms
EU Citizenship and internal market guarantees confer 
rights mainly on those holding the nationality of the 
EU Member States. However, by Treaty, these free 
movement rights are also conferred on EEA nationals, 
so along with EU Citizens, nationals of Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland enjoy free movement 
rights into the UK. The EEA Agreement goes further than 
other agreements between the EU and third countries, 
in granting free movement rights to EEA nationals. In 
contrast, the Association Agreements between the 
EU and (then) candidate Central and Eastern European 
Countries provided rights only for those wishing to 
establish businesses, while the EU’s Agreement with 
Turkey provides some rights for Turkish workers who are 
already resident in the EU.
 
In addition, in two contexts TCNs also derive rights from 
EU Citizenship and the internal market. First, EU Citizens 
may be joined or accompanied by their family members, 
irrespective of their nationality. In practice, this means 
that EU Citizens have a right to family reunification 
which can sometimes prevail over domestic immigration 
restrictions. Also, the internal market freedoms include 
a right for companies providing services to bring their 
TCN workforce with them temporarily. This phenomenon 
of ‘posting workers’ has been legally and politically 
controversial, for example leading to industrial strife 
at the Lindsey Oil Refinery in the UK in 2009 (Barnard 
2009). 
 
Overall though, the key status of EU Citizenship is 
confined to those holding the nationality of the Member 
States. Member States, at least under the current 
state of EU law, remain free to grant nationality as 
they please, although some EU principles constrain the 
withdrawal of nationality where this has an impact on 
EU rights. (See Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann [2009] 
ECR I-0000).
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Why has the UK not become a full member 
of the Schengen system?
 
When the UK joined the (then) EEC in 1972, it became 
committed to the common market project. The 
movement of persons within the EU took on additional 
salience with the internal market project of the 1980s, 
with some Member States taking the view that internal 
free movement of persons required the abolition of 
border controls within the EU. The Treaty definition of 
the internal market provides that it comprises ‘an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, capital and services is ensured.’ 
The UK position was reflected in a special Protocol to 
the EU Treaties, which stipulates that notwithstanding 
the internal market, the UK maintains its right to keep 
border controls on movement from within the EU.
 
In part due to UK resistance, other Member States set 
up the Schengen system (the Schengen Agreement 
[1985] and its implementing convention [1990]) in 
order to facilitate internal free movement and establish 
several ‘flanking policies’ on immigration, asylum and 
visas. In one view, internal free movement requires 
common, restrictive policies on internal security, 
borders, immigration and asylum. However, this 
compensatory measures rationale is in reality shaky. Bigo 
goes so far as to describe the compensatory measures 
rationale, and the account of the security deficit created 
by the opening of the internal borders as ‘one of the 
strongest myths of EU self-presentation’ (Bigo 2003).
 
The Schengen Area aims to be without internal border 
controls. It comprises 25 countries (22 EU Member 
States – Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden – plus the three associated countries 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland). In June 2011, the 
European Council summit concluded that ‘As a very 
last resort... a safeguard clause could be introduced to 
allow the exceptional reintroduction of internal border 
controls.’ This decision was in response to unilateral 
action by some EU Member States unlawfully reinstating 
internal border controls. Legally, the change requires a 
Commission proposal (expected in autumn 2011) and 
adoption by the Council and Parliament. It remains to be 
seen whether any substantial institutional change will 
emerge.
 
The UK has never become a Schengen member, 
opting to preserve autonomous border controls and 
visa policy, as is reflected in the Schengen Protocol. 
The Schengen System is now integrated within the 
EU framework, although the UK participates therein 
selectively. In general, the UK participates in the 
criminal law and policing aspects, but not those related 
to border controls. The UK’s position on Schengen is 
officially explained as frontier controls which ‘match 
both the geography and traditions of the country 
and have ensured a high degree of personal freedom 
within the UK’, whereas on the continent ‘because of 
the difficulty of policing long land frontiers, there is 
greater dependence on internal controls, such as identity 
checks.’ (Home Office White Paper 1998). This official 
explanation is open to question, and seems to rest as a 
caricature of the continental systems (Wiener 1999). 
However, it is firmly established and has been reinforced 
by successive governments’ assertions that the UK’s 
maintenance of its own border controls is required, as 
the UK is simply better at protecting its own borders 
than the Schengen states are at protecting theirs, 
pointing in particular to the weaknesses of the EU’s 
eastern land borders. The empirical premise may be open 
to question, but nonetheless, the policy position is that:
 
Given the views of successive Governments on the 
comparative strengths of the United Kingdom and 
Schengen borders, it seems to us that ‘Possibly, but 
not yet’ will for many years to come be the reply 
to the question of the United Kingdom becoming a 
full Schengen State. (House of Lords EU Committee 
2008b: para 45).
 
The current government is, if anything, even more 
wedded to a selective approach (Secretary of State for 
the Home Department 2011).
 
Although the UK remains outside of the the Schengen 
border free area, its existence has had an impact on UK 
border practices. In particular, the UK’s establishment 
of so-called juxtaposed border controls in France is 
seen as a response to the internal free movement 
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across the continent (Ryan 2004). Moreover, the UK 
does participate in the policing and security aspects of 
Schengen. Under the Schengen Protocol, the UK may 
‘request to take part in some or all of the provisions of 
this acquis.’ The request requires unanimous approval 
of the other Schengen states. The UK has challenged 
its legal exclusion from three EU border measures with 
a security dimension: the creation of Frontex (the EU’s 
external border agency discussed below); EU measures 
on biometric passports and the decision allowing police 
services access to data in the EU Visa Information 
System. However, the Court of Justice confirmed that 
the UK’s participation in new aspects of the Schengen 
system is in effect subject to prior approval of the 
other Member States regarding the UK’s participation 
in the relevant rules on borders (Case C-77/05 UK v 
Council and Case C-137/05 UK v Council 18 December 
2007; Riipma 2008; Case C-482/08, United Kingdom 
v Council 26 October 2010). In effect, the UK cannot 
expect to participate in border control/enforcement 
measures which are framed as ‘Schengen-building’ 
without adopting the underlying rules on border 
crossings first.
 
Frontex
While the European Commission once floated the idea 
of a common European border guard (see House of 
Lords European Union Committee 2003), Frontex is 
currently an agency with a more modest coordinating 
role between national authorities. Its main tasks include 
coordinating operational cooperation between national 
authorities on external borders; undertaking risk 
analyses and research on the control and surveillance 
of external borders; assisting in training border guards; 
and, potentially, supporting the running of joint return 
operations.
 
The external borders of the Member States include the 
borders (land and sea borders, as well as all airports and 
seaports) to which EU law on crossing external borders 
applies. The expanse of land and sea includes the Spanish 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, the Polish-
Ukrainian land border, and the sea borders of Spain 
(including the Canary Islands) and Italy and Greece, 
including their islands. (However, it explicitly excludes 
Gibralter, due to the on-going disagreement between 
Spain and the UK on its frontiers).
 
Based in Warsaw, Frontex has been operational since 
2005 and has engaged in several joint operations 
at the EU’s external borders since then, mainly at 
the sea borders, including in the Canary Islands and 
around Malta, Lampedusa and Sicily. While it aims to 
support and supplement national border controls, not 
replace them (Frontex 2007), its budget and remit 
have grown quickly, as reflected in the adoption of the 
legal framework for Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(RABITS) comprised of officers from various countries, 
including the UK, in order to provide assistance in border 
controls from time-to-time.
 
The House of Lords EU Committee conveys the 
current UK position on Frontex as follows: ‘The United 
Kingdom would like to participate fully in Frontex, but 
the Court of Justice has ruled that it cannot.’ (Case 
C-77/05 UK v Council discussed above). And further 
that ‘for the present the UK has to accept that, not 
being a full Schengen State, it cannot play a full role in 
FRONTEX. Subject to that limitation, the Government 
should ensure that the UK participates effectively in 
the development and operation of Frontex.’ (House 
of Lords EU Committee 2008b: para 60). The UK 
only has observer status on the Frontex Management 
Board, yet it does contribute to practical cooperation 
and has been involved in several joint operations. The 
Management Board reports annually to the European 
Parliament, Council and Commission. Accountability 
concerns remain. For instance, in 2007 the European 
Parliament’s LIBE Committee held a hearing on ‘Tragedies 
of Migrants at Sea’ and no Frontex official was able to 
attend, prompting calls to the European Parliament for 
formal accountability mechanisms (House of Lords EU 
Committee 2008b: para 91). In addition, analysis of 
joint actions has revealed human rights concerns (Guild 
and Bigo 2010).
 
The interception of irregular migrants at sea clearly has 
implications for refugee protection. Cases are pending 
before the European Court of Human Rights which 
will clarify states’ human rights responsibilities in this 
context (Hirsi v Italy). Under the Refugee Convention, 
states’ obligations of non-refoulement are pertinent 
(Goodwin-Gill 2011). Interception is but one of the 
many tools used to prevent or deter the arrival of 
asylum seekers (See further the Migration Observatory 
policy primer on Asylum Policy.
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What is the UK position on the moves 
towards a Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS)?
 
Asylum formed part of the Schengen system, and was 
for many years subject to cooperation at EU level. Prior 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the EU had set up 
the Dublin system for allocation of responsibility for 
processing asylum claims, and adopted several non-
binding resolutions on asylum matters. During this 
period, there were also strong horizontal policy transfers 
across European countries (Byrne, Noll and Vedsted-
Hansen 2004).
 
The Dublin System
The Dublin System allocates responsibility for asylum 
claims to the first EU Member State where an asylum 
seeker arrives, leading to the overburdening of the 
Member States at the EU’s periphery. Member States 
are permitted to take charge of asylum applications 
even where others are responsible. Accordingly, Member 
States are not obliged to send back asylum seekers, 
although they are obliged to take them back. The 
unfairness and inefficiency of the Dublin system is well-
established. It overburdens countries on the EU’s edges, 
caused extreme hardship to asylum seekers and appears 
to have led to an increase in the use of detention. 
Asylum seekers have frequently turned to human rights 
law, particularly to the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg, to resist transfers to other EU Member 
States, invoking dangers of refoulement from those 
states and the woeful conditions of asylum seekers in 
some EU Member States.
 
In the UK, legislation was passed to preclude judicial 
review in these situations (Rawlings 2005) which 
itself was ultimately found to violate the ECHR. Most 
recently in January 2011, the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights held that it would 
violate Article 3 EHCR (the right not to be subjected 
to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment) to return 
asylum seekers to Greece (MSS v Belgium and Greece). 
The UK had persisted in such transfers in spite of 
well-documented human rights concerns. A UK court 
has also referred questions about Dublin transfers to 
the Luxembourg Court, which are still pending at the 
time of writing. (Case C-411/10 NS v SSHD [referred 
18 August 2010] OJ C274/21). It is expected that 
the Luxembourg court will follow Strasbourg’s lead in 
clarifying Member States’ human rights responsibilities.
 
The UK has opted in to the main post-Amsterdam 
asylum directives, being the Temporary Protection 
Directive, and those on asylum procedures, qualification 
and reception conditions adopted between 2000 and 
2005. In defining the refugee, the EU is writing the 
Refugee Convention into EU law, and also creating a 
status for some who are currently non-removable under 
the UK’s obligations under human rights law (Lambert 
2006). While the EU harmonisation exercise established 
only minimum standards and leaves Member States 
considerable leeway to do their own thing, writing 
refugee law into EU law brings with it other EU law 
doctrines and (since Lisbon) entails a full role for the 
Luxembourg court in asylum law and policy. UK courts 
too have made important rulings on the Reception 
Conditions Directive, clarifying the right to work of 
asylum seekers who have been awaiting decisions in the 
UK beyond the one year period specified in the Directive 
(ZO (Somalia) [2010] UKSC 36).
 
These directives are referred to as the ‘first phase’ of the 
CEAS and the EU is currently engaged in their reform. 
The UK government has decided not to participate fully 
in the reform process, as is its prerogative under its 
Protocol on these matters, with the Home Office stating: 
‘[W]e do not judge that adopting a common EU asylum 
policy is right for Britain.’ (Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 2011: 2). It has also attempted to 
argue that if it does not opt in to the ‘recast’ (i.e. reform) 
measures, it will be released from its obligations under 
the first phase of the CEAS. This argument seems legally 
strained at best. Moreover, the wisdom of remaining 
out of the entire legislative reform process has been 
questioned, particularly as the UK still wants to be able 
to use the Dublin system to transfer asylum seekers 
to other EU Member States (House of Lords European 
Union Committee 2009).
How does the UK engage with EU 
immigration laws?
 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has also adopted 
a variety of binding measures on immigration. These 
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individual measures cover some forms of immigration, 
but are by no means comprehensive. For instance, 
only some high-skilled immigrants to the EU may fall 
under the Blue Card Directive. The Directive on Family 
Reunification covers some family reunification. Proposals 
are currently under examination for Directives on 
Seasonal Workers and Intra-Company Transferees. On 
security of residence and free movement within the EU, 
the key measure is the Long-term Residents Directive. 
The UK has not opted in to any of these immigration 
directives.
 
The House of Lords EU Committee has repeatedly urged 
the UK to opt in to the both the Long-term Residents 
Directive and the Family Reunification Directive. Such a 
move would strengthen the rights of the UK’s economic 
migrants and enable them to enjoy equality with 
economic migrants in the rest of the EU:
 
We consider that the United Kingdom should review 
its opt-out from both these measures, which 
together provide an excellent foundation of rights 
for migrant workers in the EU. They do not have any 
consequences for its position on border controls, 
and would enhance the position of third country 
nationals resident in the United Kingdom. When the 
Long-term Residents Directive comes into effect, 
third country nationals in the United Kingdom, for 
instance US or Indian nationals who have resided here 
for five years, will not be able to take advantage of 
the Directive’s provisions to move, for instance, to 
Paris or Frankfurt. They remain blocked in the United 
Kingdom. This is neither in their interests nor in the 
United Kingdom’s. Moreover, assimilating the position 
of long-term third country nationals’ rights to that of 
migrant citizens of the Union, including by enabling 
participation in the political life of the country, is not 
only a matter of improving their living and working 
conditions: it is also a matter of fostering their 
harmonious integration into society. (House of Lords 
European Union Committee 2005: para 102).
 
The UK has opted in to some of the EU measures which 
aim to combat ‘illegal immigration’, including the Carriers 
Sanctions Directive (2001). However, it has not opted 
in to the Return Directive (2008), a controversial EU 
measure which obliges removal of illegal immigrants and 
sets time-limits for pre-deportation detention. The UK’s 
non-participation has been explained in the following 
terms:
 
The UK has not participated in and has no plans to 
implement the EU Returns Directive 2008/115/EC. 
We agree that a collective approach to removal can 
have advantages. However, we are not persuaded 
that this Directive delivers the strong returns regime 
that is required for dealing with irregular migration. 
Our current practices on the return of illegal third 
country nationals are broadly in line with the terms 
of the Directive, but we prefer to formulate our 
own policy, in line with our stated position on 
retaining control over conditions of entry and stay. 
(Phil Woolas, Statement to Parliament, Hansard, 2 
November 2009).
 
In contrast, the UK has endorsed another central 
element of EU removals policy, namely Readmission 
Agreements with non-EU Countries, which aim not 
only to facilitate removal of irregular migrants to their 
countries of origin, but also to third countries (Ryan 
2004).
 
The best of both worlds?
 
Aside from Citizenship and the internal market, the 
UK participates selectively in EU policy on asylum and 
immigration. Tony Blair famously characterised the 
UK’s selective participation as giving it ‘the best of 
both worlds’ as the UK was not obliged to take on EU 
commitments in the asylum and immigration context 
but could opt in to measures in order to ‘make sure that 
there are proper restrictions on some of the European 
borders that end up affecting our country.’ (Tony Blair, 
25 October 2004, quoted in Geddes 2005). It has 
been contended that the UK’s ‘selective use of the EU 
as an alternative, cooperative venue for migration policy 
management actually reinforces rather than overturns 
established patterns [in domestic policy].’ (Geddes 
2005: 723).
 
A common observation is that ‘Britain has tended to 
participate in coercive measures that curtail the ability of 
migrants to enter the EU while opting out of protective 
measures [such as] on family reunion and the rights of 
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long-term residents that to some extent give rights to 
migrants and third-country nationals.’ (Fletcher 2009: 
81). This trend continues. The UK recently decided not 
to opt in to a draft EU Directive on Human Trafficking, 
while opting in to negotiations for international sharing 
of Passenger Name Records (PNR) (Secretary of State 
for the Home Department 2011).
 
The disadvantages of the UK’s selective approach should 
also be noted. The UK may find itself excluded from EU 
policies it wishes to engage in, as the rulings on Frontex, 
biometric passports and data from the visa information 
system illustrate. Moreover, the new government’s 
reluctance to engage with the reforms to EU asylum 
measures may also undermine its position when seeking 
to use the Dublin system. The failure to opt in to EU 
measures clearly diminishes migrants’ rights in the UK, 
which could place the UK at a disadvantage in the race 
for talent. The case for the UK to opt in to the Long-
Term Residents Directive is strong.
The author would like to thank Professor Elspeth Guild, Professor 
Valsamis Mitsilegas and Dr Martin Ruhs for immensely helpful 
comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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• Returns Directive: Directive 2008/115/EC on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348.
• Blue Card Directive: Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment 
[2009] OJ L155/17.
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